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Wealth Distribution, Entrepreneurship
and Intertemporal Trade*
Sanjay Banerji†, Ngo Van Long‡
Résumé / Abstract
On étudie les échanges intertemporels entre deux pays ayant des
distributions de richesses différentes. On montre que, à cause du risque moral et
de l'imperfection du marché de capital, les gens très riches ou très pauvres
choississent de ne pas devenir entrepreneurs. À un taux d'intérêt donné, le pays
dont la distribution de richesse est moins égalitaire a une offre d'entrepreneurs
plus élevée, ce qui lui donne, en équilibre d'autarcie, un taux d'intérêt plus élevé.
Par conséquent, quand le commerce international est permis entre deux pays, celui
dont la distribution de richesse est moins égalitaire deviendra le pays créditeur.
Les politiques redistributives peuvent donc influencer le profil du commerce
intertemporel. Par exemple, si le gouvernement d'un pays adopte une politique
d'aide aux entreprises qui font faillite, l'offre d'entrepreneurs de ce pays
augmentera, ce qui, à son tour, haussera le taux d'intérê}t en équilibre d'autarcie.
Un pays créditeur deviendra un pays endetté quand une telle polique est
introduite.
This paper examines the pattern of intertemporal trade between countries
with different distribution of wealth. We also examine the consequences of
redistribution policies in this framework. The driving force of our model are risk
aversion, capital market imperfections, and costs associated with default. We
show that under capital market imperfections due to moral hazard, the very rich
and the very poor do not undertake any risk and become passive lenders. Only
individuals whose wealth lies within a medium range choose to become
entrepreneurs. At any given rate of interest, a country with with a wealth
distribution that is relatively less skewed to the left will have a greater supply of
entrepreneurs, leading to a higher equilibrium interest rate under autarky. Hence,
when the countries are opened to trade, those economies with highly skewed
distribution (to the left) will become net lenders. Redistributive policies therefore
will have impact on intertemporal trade. For example, if a government adopts a
bail-out policy (a redistribution from successful enterpreneurs to unsuccessful
ones) will increase the supply of enterpreneurs, driving up the autarkic interest
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rate. Consequently, a country which would be a lender if there were no bail-out
policy is a net borrower under the bail-out policy.
Mots Clés : Échange intertemporel, distributions des richesses, risque moral, prudence,
marché de capital imparfait, entrepreneurship
Keywords: Intertemporal trade, wealth distribution, moral hazard, prudence, imperfect capital
market, entrepreneurship
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the pattern of intertemporal trade between countries
with dierent distributions of wealth. We also examine the consequences of
redistribution policies in this framework. The driving forces of our model are
risk aversion, capital market imperfections, and costs associated with default.
We show that under capital market imperfections due to moral hazard, the
very rich and the very poor do not undertake any risk and become passive
lenders. Only individuals whose wealth lies within a medium range choose to
become entrepreneurs. At any given rate of interest, a country with with a
wealth distribution that is relatively less skewed to the left will have a greater
supply of entrepreneurs, leading to a higher equilibrium interest rate under
autarky. Hence, when the countries are opened to trade, those economies
with highly skewed distribution (to the left) will become net lenders.
Redistributive policies therefore will have impacts on intertemporal trade.
For example, if a government adopts a bail-out policy (a redistribution from
successful enterpreneurs to unsuccessful ones), this will increase the supply of
enterpreneurs, driving up the autarkic interest rate. Consequently, a country
which would be a lender if there were no bail-out policy is a net borrower
under the bail-out policy.
While the literature on risk aversion and entrepreneurship (see below for
a brief survey) emphasizes the role of the coeÆcient of risk aversion in a loan
market with perfect information, we show that it is the concept of prudence
that plays an important role when risk-averse individuals borrow in a market
under imperfect information.
An interesting feature of the paper is the endogenous determination of
occupational choice. Individuals with identical utility functions but dier-
ent wealth endowments self-select to be (or not to be) entrepreneur. In our
model, the outcome of any investment project depends on the eort level of
the entrepreneur in charge of the project. This eort level is not observable
by lenders or nancial intermediaries. Contracts are designed to give en-
trepreneurs incentives to exert eort. While these contracts mitigate against
opportunism by entrepreneurs, they cannot replicate the outcome that would
be obtained under symmetric information. An important implication of our
results is that, in an extended version of the model, a well-designed redistri-
bution of wealth may stimulate risk-taking activities and result in a higher
growth rate.
Our paper builds on, and extends, earlier contributions to the literature
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that connects income distribution to occupational choice in the context of
capital market imperfections. It is useful to oer here a brief comparison of
assumptions and results. Kihlstrom and Laont (1979) consider a society
with individuals having utility functions with dierent degrees of risk aver-
sion. They show that more risk-averse individuals become workers while less
risk-averse ones become entrepreneurs. In our model all individuals have the
same utility function, but dierent endowments of wealth. It is the dier-
ence in initial wealths that causes individuals to choose dierent occupations.
Kanbur (1979) also studies the relationship between risk taking and income
distribution. He assumes that individuals have identical attitude to risk, but
their production functions are ex-post dierent from each other because of in-
dependent productivity shocks which are observed before individuals decide
on becoming entrepreneur or worker.
Galor and Ziera (1993) consider a model with irreversible investment
involving xed costs. They assume that agents borrow to nance their in-
vestment in skill acquisition, and bequeath some of their wealth. The lending
rate is higher than the borrowing rate, and the cost of borrowing is higher for
borrowers with low initial wealth. The amounts these borrowers bequeath
are also smaller. The authors show that agents whose wealth lies below a
threshold level nd it optimal to choose unskilled jobs, with low wages. As
a result, their descendents will also choose to be unskilled workers due to
their low level of inherited wealth. A similar model is studied by Banerjee
and Newman (1993) who assume that borrowers need to oer collaterals to
lenders. Children of poor individuals do not inherit much, and therefore can-
not oer suÆcient collaterals to potential lenders. They are thus forced to
choose not to be entrepreneurs. de Meza and Webb (1999) show that lack
of information on the part of banks may lead to an over-provision of loans
that encourages entry into entrepreneurship. If the associated incentive ef-
fects are strong, then there will be a positive relationship between wealth
and entrepreneurial activities.
Aghion and Bolton (1997) formulate a model similar to ours, but they
assume that all agents are risk-neutral. The probability of success of a project
is dependent on the eort level chosen by the entrepreneur. In their model,
individuals in the right-hand tail of the wealth distribution are entrepreneurs
who do not borrow, while individuals in the middle section of the wealth
distribution need to borrow to be entrepreneurs, because they do not have
suÆcient wealth to pay for the lumpy investment. This is in marked contrast
to our result that very wealthy individuals may nd it optimal not to be
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entrepreneur. The dierence is partly due to the fact that we assume (a) risk
aversion (b) partial collateral, and (b) bankruptcy cost, while Aghion and
Bolton assume risk neutrality and strictly limited liability (zero payments to
banks in the event of project failure).
Newman (1995) assumes risk aversion, and nd that, under moral hazard,
the poorer individuals tend to be risk-takers and the wealthier individuals
are risk-averters. This may be explained as follows. Optimal contract under
moral hazard serve to resolve the tension between consumption- smoothing
across states of nature, and eÆcient deployment of eort. We know that
wealthier individuals tend to need less insurance at the margin. Optimal
contracts prompt them to bear more risk at any given eort level. Individuals
with greater wealth nd it too costly (in terms of eort) to bear risks, as
designed in the contracts.
All the models cited above share a common assumption: there is no
transfer of resources from the entrepreneurs to the lenders in the event of
project failure. This may be called the \strong limited liability" assumption.
Our model allow a weaker version of limited liability: we assume that part of
an entrepreneur's private savings must be used to pay debts in the event of
project failure. In addition, we assume the existence of a small real resource
cost in the settling of a bankruptcy case. These twin assumptions play an
important role in our model. We nd that the very poor do not take risks,
because the marginal utilty of wealth in the event of bankruptcy is very
high. We also nd that the very rich do not become entrepreneurs, because
the eort is very costly.
The papers cited above deal with closed economies, and most authors
consider only a partial equilibrium setting. Grossman (1984) addressed the
issue of the relationship between international trade and the formation of an
entrepreneurial class. He showed that in a free trade equilibrium, there is
a tendency to over-specialize in the non-risky sector and under-specialize in
risk-taking activities. However, in his model, there was no risk sharing ar-
rangements. The non-existence of nancial market was exogenously imposed.
As Dixit (1987) pointed out, once the incentive compatibility conditions are
explicitly introduced, the market outcome is arguably a Pareto optimum.
That is, once the sources of market imperfections are specied, risk-sharing
arrangements will incorporate those features in incentive compatibility con-
ditions, and it would be impossible to improve upon the market by means
of public provision of insurance etc. Grossman and Maggi (2000) consider a
model where the trade pattern reects the distribution of talent across the
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labor forces of the two countries. They show that a country with a more
diverse work force exports the good for which individual success is more im-
portant than team production. Adverse selection tends to create a mismatch
of talents which tend to be exacerbated under free trade. While Grossman
and Maggi place emphasis on the interaction between distribution of talents,
adverse selection in the labor market, and trade, our paper is concerned with
interactions between wealth distributions, moral hazard, and imperfections
in the credit market, in the context of a trading world.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we develop a model of
a closed economy, and state the assumptions and notation. In Section 3, we
characterize equilibrium loan contracts under moral hazard, and show how
the equilibrium riskless rate of interest and the occupational choice are de-
termined. Section 4 considers a two-country world and shows how a country
with a more skewed distribution of wealth tends to be the net lender. We
also consider some extensions of the model, such as the implications of a
bail-out policy. Some concluding remarks are oered in section 5.
2 The Autarkic Equilibrium
2.1 Assumptions and Notations
We begin by considering a model of a closed economy. There is a continuum
of individuals in this economy. They dier in their initial wealth, denoted by
w. The (cumulative) distribution of initial wealth is F (w), and f(w) denotes
the corresponding density function. It is assumed that there is a closed
interval [w
L
; w
H
] over which f(w) is strictly positive, and that f(w) = 0 for
all w outside this interval. We assume 0 < w
L
< w
H
. Then
Z
w
H
w
L
f(w)dw = 1
and the per capita wealth is
w =
Z
w
H
w
L
wf(w)dw:
There are only two periods. For simplicity, we assume that consumption
takes place only in period two
1
. In period one, each individual may choose
1
This assumption is also made by Gertler and Rogo (1990), but in their model, unlike
ours, entrepreneurship is not endogenous. Aghion and Bolton (1997) also assume that
consumption takes place after the realization of the investment.
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to be an entrepreneur (in which case he would carry out a risky business
activity, using part of his own wealth, plus some additional borrowing, to
nance his investment project), or he may choose not to be an entrepreneur
(in which case he would keep all his wealth in the form of a deposit in a
nancial institution, which oers him the riskless gross rate of return r > 1).
The endogenous determination of r will be explained in due course.
We assume that wealth, in its physical form, cannot be stored
2
. It fol-
lows that all wealth must eventually be lent (via the nancial institutions)
to entrepreneurs, who use them as input in their investment projects. We
adopt the standard assumption that nancial institutions are risk neutral
and perfectly competitive, so that their expected prots are zero.
Each entrepreneur can carry out only one investment project. Each
project requires

k units of wealth. We assume that

k > w
H
(1)
so that all entrepreneurs need external nancing. A project can turn out to
be a success or a failure. In the case of success, the pay-o of the project is
a >

k. In the case of failure, the pay-o is zero. The probability of success
is denoted by (e), where e is the eort level of the entrepreneur, which is
not observable by the market. For simplicity, we assume that e can take only
two possible values, 0 or 1. We write p = (1) > q = (0). This indicates
that the model exhibits the moral hazard property: the entrepreneur, who
is a net borrower, may have an incentive to work at an eort level that is
lower than what would be eÆcient in a world of perfect information. In what
follows, unless otherwise stated, we assume that p   q is suÆciently great,
so that the equilibrium contracts have the following property: entrepreneurs
are suÆciently rewarded for success that they have an incentive to set e = 1
even though e is not observable.
Since each entrepreneur needs

k units of capital as input, the assump-
tion that

k > w
H
implies that in equilibrium, the endogenous number of
entrepreneurs, N , is less than the number of individuals in this economy, M .
Each individual has the following utility function
U = U(y; e) = v(y)  e
2
An alternative assumption is that wealth can be stored but the rate of return on
storage is lower than the equilibrium market rate of interest.
5
where y denotes his wealth in period 2, e is his eort level, e 2 f0; 1g and 
is a positive parameter. We set  = 1 by normalization
3
. The function v(y)
is increasing and strictly concave, with
v
0
(0) =1:
This property implies that each individual will invest some wealth in the
riskless asset (i.e., lending to a nancial institution), to avoid having zero
wealth in period 2.
While the outcome of any given project is uncertain, we assume the proba-
bility of success of any given project is independent of those of other projects,
and that the number of projects is large enough so that the law of large num-
ber applies. Thus, for the economy as a whole, if all entrepreneurs choose
e = 1, aggregate output is paN where N is the measure of the set of individ-
uals who, in equilibrium, choose to be entrepreneur.
Since the expected return on a project is pa and entrepreneurs have to
incur eort cost, it is the case that the riskless rate of interest r must satisfy
the condition that
r

k < pa + (1  p)0 (2)
2.2 A Benchmark Case: Observable Eort and No
Bankruptcy Cost
If the eort level of each entrepreneur is observable, and if there is no
bankruptcy cost, then we are in the rst-best world. Since there is a contin-
uum of individuals and a continuum of investment projects, in the aggregate
there is no risk, and a perfect insurance market implies that all individuals
are perfectly insured, given that their function v(y) is strictly concave. We
focus on the case where p=q is suÆciently great, so that optimal contracts
specify that entrepreneurs must exercise full eort (e = 1).
Given the rate of interest r;competitive nancial institutions oer con-
tracts that specify, for any given w, the amount

k   k(w) to be lent to the
entrepreneur with wealth w, and the payments R
s
(w) and R
f
(w) that he
must make in the events of success and failure respectively. Here k(w) de-
notes the amount of equity that the entrepreneur puts in his project. The
3
An entrepreneur can choose e to be 0 or 1. Non-entrepreneurs need not expend any
eort, thus their e is 0.
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equilibrium contract maximizes his expected utility, given that e = 1, subject
to zero expected prot for the nancial institutions:
max pv [(w   k)r + a R
s
] + (1  p)v [(w   k)r  R
f
]  1
subject to
pR
s
+ (1  p)R
f
= r(

k   k)
The solution yields constant utility across states of nature
(w   k)r + a R
s
= (w   k)r  R
f
At the optimum, R
s
+ rk and R
f
+ rk are determined by
R
s
+ rk = (1  p)a+ r

k
R
f
+ rk = R
s
+ rk   a
Thus, given r, the expected utility of an entrepreneur with initial wealth w
who accepts a contract that stipulates e = 1, is
EV
e
(w; 1; r) = v
h
wr + pa  r

k
i
  1 (3)
Similarly, a zero-expected-prot contract that maximizes the expected u-
tility of an entrepreneur with initial wealth w, given that his eort is specied
to be e = 0, yields the net utility
EV
e
(w; 0; r) = v
h
wr + qa  r

k
i
  0 (4)
Dene the function
(w; r)  EV
e
(w; 1; r) EV
e
(w; 0; r) = v
h
wr + pa  r

k
i
 1 v
h
wr + qa  r

k
i
(5)
This function measures, for an individual with wealth w; the relative at-
tractivenes of being an entrepreneur with e = 1 (rather than being an en-
trepreneur with e = 0). It is decreasing in w for any given r: 
w
< 0.We
assume that, for all r < pa=

k, (w; r) > 0 for w = w
L
and (w; r) < 0
for w suÆciently great. Then there exists a \critical value" w
c
(r) such that
individuals with wealth w < w
c
(r) will prefer being an entrepreneur with
e = 1 to being one with e = 0. Since (w; r) is increasing in r for all w <

k,
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if w
c
(r) < w
H
(which is less than

k by assumption), an increase in r will
increase w
c
:
dw
c
dr
=  

r

w
=  
fv
0
h
wr + pa  r

k
i
  v
0
h
wr + qa  r

k
i
g(w  

k)

w
> 0
A pure lender, on the other hand, obtains the utility v(wr): If r > qa=

k,
[respectively, if r < qa=

k] the strategy of being a pure lender dominates
[respectively, is dominated by] that of being an entrepreneur who exerts no
eort. We assume that q is so small that in equilibrium, r > qa=

k. Let us
dene
 (w; r) = EV
e
(w; 1; r)  1  v(wr)
This function measures, for an individual with wealth w; the relative attrac-
tivenes of being an entrepreneur with e = 1 (rather than being a pure lender.)
Then, for all r in the interval [qa=

k; pa=

k],  (w; r) is decreasing in w: 
w
< 0.
There exists a value w
b
(r) such that  (w
b
(r); r) = 0. Given the assumption
that r > qa=

k, we can deduce that w
b
(r) < w
c
(r), and
dw
b
dr
=  
 
r
 
w
=  
v
0
h
wr + pa  r

k
i
(w  

k)  v
0
(wr)w
v
0
h
wr + pa  r

k
i
r   v
0
[wr] r
< 0
Thus, in this economy, under perfect information (i.e., eort is observ-
able), the demand for loans is
B(r) =
Z
w
b
(r)
w
L
(

k   w)f(w)dw
and the supply of loans is
L(r) =
Z
W
H
w
b
(r)
wf(w)dw
Since B
0
(r) = (

k   w
b
)f(w
b
)
dw
b
dr
< 0 and L
0
(r) =  w
b
f(w
b
)
dw
b
dr
> 0, the
demand curve is downward sloping, and the supply curve is upward sloping.
Their intersection determines the equilibrium interest rate, r

. At r

, demand
equals supply, B(r

) = L(r

), implying

k
Z
w
b
(r

)
w
L
f(w)dw =
Z
w
H
w
L
wf(w)dw = w
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Let
w

 w
b
(r

)
and let F (w) denote the cumulative distribution of wealth:
F (w) 
Z
w
w
L
f(z)dz
then
F (w

) =
w

k
To summarize, under perfect information, the fraction of population who
are entrepreneurs in equilibrium is w=

k, and only individuals whose wealth
is smaller than w

 F
 1
( w=

k) will choose to be entrepreneurs.
2.3 The Moral Hazard Case: Unobservable Eort
Now we turn to the case of unobservable eort levels. We continue to as-
sume that each entrepreneur's wealth is known to the nancial intermediaries.
This, and the assumption that individuals have the same utility function and
identical ability means that there is no adverse selection problem: no one can
lie about his wealth or his utility function. The only problem is moral hazard:
if how much an entrepreneur must pay back to the nancial intermediaries
is independent of his eort level, then he may have an incentive to exert no
eort. Contracts must therefore be designed to provide suÆcient incentive
for enterpreneurs to choose e = 1 (This is of course based on the assumption
that p  q is suÆciently great to justify the choice e = 1:)
We now describe a contract for an entrepreneur with wealth level w.
Recall that we assumed w
H
<

k. The contract says that \if your wealth is
w and you contribute an amount k  w as your \equity" in your investment
project (so that your borrowing from your nancial institution is

k  k  0)
and you deposit the remaining w k at a nancial institution, then you must
pay back to your lender (the nancial institution, or FI for short) an amount
which depends on the outcome of your project. If the outcome is \success",
your investment yields the gross return a, and you must pay an amount R
to your FI; if your outcome is \failure" (the investment yields a gross return
of zero), then, with your period two wealth (w   k)r, you must pay back to
the FI an amount (

k   k) > 0". (In what follows, we assume  < r.) The
assumption that  > 0 is meant to capture the fact that most real world
credit contracts are at least partly secured by some sort of collateral. We do
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not model the determination of . It is exogenously specied, and is assumed
to be very small.
It follows that if the entrepreneur exerts eort (i.e., e = 1), then his
expected utility is
pv [(w   k)r + a R] + (1  p)v
h
(w   k)r   (

k   k)
i
  1  G(w; k; R; 1)
and if he does not exert eort (i.e., e = 0), then his expected utility is
qv [(w   k)r + a  R] + (1  q)v
h
(w   k)r   (

k   k)
i
 G(w; k; R; 0)
We assume also that when a bankrupt entrepreneur pays the amount
(

k  k) > 0 to his FI, the latter only gets a fraction  of it: In other words,
the FI incurs a real cost (1   )(

k   k) in collecting (

k   k) from the
failed entrepreneur. Bankruptcy costs are cost associated with the transfer
of resources from the debtor to the creditor in the bad state of nature. These
costs consist of legal fees, delay costs, etc. Several studies have shown that
such costs can have an impact on the value of claims owned by creditors and
are reected in the pricing of loans.
Thus an FI that lends the amount

k   k to an entrepreneur who does
exert eort can expect to get
pR + (1  p)(

k   k)
On the other hand, the FI takes r as given, and must pay the amount r(

k k)
to depositors. In equilibrium, we have the following zero expected prot
condition (if e = 1):
pR + (1  p)(

k   k) = r(

k   k) (6)
Competition among the FIs imply that, for given r, the FIs will oer
to any entrepreneur with wealth w a contract that maximizes his expected
utility, subject to the zero prot condition. We also assume that the contract
provides enough incentive for the entrepreneur to exert eort (e = 1). More
formally, FI j will oer to the entrepreneur with wealth w a pair of number-
s (R; k) that maximizes G(w; k; R; 1) subject to the incentive compatibility
constraint
G(w; k; R; 1)  G(w; k; R; 0) (7)
and the zero prot constraint (6).
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3 Properties of the Equilibrium Contracts
We now turn to a fuller characterization of equilibrium contracts. We proceed
as follows. First, we take the interest rate r as given, and show how the
incentive compatibility constraint and the zero prot condition determine
the contract for entrepreneurs at each wealth level. Then we show how the
the interest rate r is determined endogenously. In what follows, we normalize
by setting  = 1.
3.1 Equilibrium loan contracts for entrepreneurs, giv-
en the interest rate on the safe asset
In equilibrium, prot will be zero, and the incentive compatibility constrain-
t binds for each entrepreneur. It follows that, for given r, conditions (6)
and (7) determine the equilibrium contract for entrepreneurs with wealth
w. The following lemma characterizes the equilibrium contract, under the
assumption that  is small:
LEMMA 1: (Equilibrium contract) In equilibrium, for given r, there
exists a lower bound w > 0 such that entrepreneurs with wealth w  w will
be lent the amount

k  k(w) and will be asked to pay the amount R(w)  0
in the event of success, and 
h

k   k(w)
i
 0 in the event of failure, where
the pair (R(w); k(w)) satisfy the following conditions:
(i) the expected prot of the FI is zero
R =
(

k   k)
p
[r   (1  p)] for k 

k (8)
and (ii) the incentive compatibility constraint holds with equality
v [(w   k)r + a R]  v
h
(w   k)r   (

k   k)
i
=
1
p  q
(9)
Proof: See the Appendix.
REMARK 1: Equation (8) implies that, given the riskless rate of interest
r, the repayment to the FI (in the event of success) per dollar borrowed is a
constant, independent of the amount borrowed:
r
s

R

k   k
=
1
p
[r   (1  p)] :
11
(Note that r
s
depends on r, and that the repayment received by the FI, in
the event of failure, is  per dollar borrowed.) Given , which is exogenous
in our model, nancial institutions will be willing to lend only to individuals
whose wealth exceeds a certain lower bound w > 0:
REMARK 2: Equation (8) is represented in Figure 1 by the downward s-
loping curveKK in the (k; R) space, with the vertical intercept[r   (1  p)]

k=p. If p  q is suÆciently close to one, and  is suÆciently small, then the
intercept of the second curve (dened by (9) and denoted as the curve V V )
is below [r   (1  p)]

k=p and hence the two curves will have an intersec-
tion (k(w); R(w)) with k(w) > 0 and R(w) > 0, if w exceeds a certain lower
bound w > 0.
PLEASE PLACE FIGURE 1 HERE
LEMMA 2: Entrepreneurs with greater w will borrow less (i.e.

k k(w)
decreases with wealth) and hence invest more (put more equity) in the risky
project, i.e. k
0
(w) > 0, given that contracts must satisfy (8) and (9).
Proof: Note that the curve KK is independent of w. For any given k,
an increase in w will shift the curve V V down, resulting in an intersection
to the right of the former intersection. Hence k

increases, and R

decreases.
This means the individual borrows less when his wealth increases.
REMARK 3: One of the standard text-book results is that if the payo
per dollar invested in a risky asset in each state of nature is independent
of the amount invested in the risky asset, then the amount an individual
invests in the risky asset is an increasing function of his wealth if and only if
his absolute risk aversion is a decreasing function of wealth. Our result in
Lemma 2 is dierent, because the pay-o per dollar of equity in the event of
success is
Æ
s
=
a  R
k
=
a
k
 
1
pk
[r   (1  p)] (

k   k)
which is dependent on k (decreasing in k). (And similarly, the pay-o per
dollar of equity in the event of failure increases in k.) Lemma 1 states that,
with a concave utility function, but independently of whether absolute risk
aversion is a decreasing or increasing function, entrepreneurs with greater
wealth will contribute more equity in the project.
LEMMA 3: Given that contracts must satisfy (8) and (9), entrepreneurs
with greater w will invest more in the riskless asset, (i.e., w k

(w) increases
with w), and at the same time putting more equity in the risky project, if
12
and only if the following condition holds
v
0
(s)(r   ) > [v
0
(u)  v
0
(s)]p (10)
where u is the nal wealth in the failure state,
u  u(w)  (w   k(w))r   (

k   k(w)) (11)
and s is the nal wealth in the success state,
s  s(w)  (w   k(w))r + a  R(w) (12)
Proof: From (8) and (9), we get
dk
dw
=
[v
0
(u)  v
0
(s)] pr
[v
0
(u)  v
0
(s)] pr + v
0
(s)(r   )  [v
0
(u)  v
0
(s)]p
(13)
which is less than 1 if and only if (10) holds.
REMARK 4: Condition (10) holds if  is small, which is assumed here.
3.2 An example: logarithmic utility
Let
v(y) = ln y
then we obtain from (9)
ln
"
(w   k)r + a  R
(w   k)r   (

k   k)
#
=
1
p  q
hence
wr   kr + a  (

k   k)r
s
=
h
wr   kr   (

k   k)
i
e
1=(p q)
Thus
h
r
s
+ (r   )e
1=(p q)
  r
i
k =
h
r
s
  e
1=(p q)
i

k   a+ rw
h
e
1=(p q)
  1
i
(14)
i.e.,
k(w) =
h
r
s
  e
1=(p q)
i

k   a+ rw
h
e
1=(p q)
  1
i
[r
s
+ (r   )e
1=(p q)
  r]
(15)
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which is positive if w exceeds a certain lower bound w > 0, and
dk
dw
=
h
e
1=(p q)
  1
i
r
[e
1=(p q)
  1] r + [r
s
  e
1=(p q)
]
which is positive and less than 1 provided  is small. This is consistent with
Lemmas 2 and 3.
3.3 To be or not to be an entrepreneur
So far, we have characterized contracts that the FIs oer to potential en-
trepreneurs with wealth w, which would make him choose e = 1, assuming
that he does want to be an entrepreneur. But depending on his wealth, an
individual may nd that the utility of being a lender; v(rw), may exceed the
expected utility of being an entrepreneur, i.e., it is possible that, for some w,
we have
v(rw) > EU  pv(s) + (1  p)v(u)  1 (16)
Clearly, if w is close to zero, condition (16) will be satised, because
nancial institutions lend a positive amount only to individuals with w 
w > 0: Thus the curve v(rw) lies above the curve EU when w is small: At
some
b
w > 0, the curve EU cuts the curve v(rw) from below. The question
is whether there exists some value
e
w >
b
w such that the curve v(rw) again
overtakes the curve EU . The answer turns out to depends on the magnitude
of the coeÆcient of prudence, a concept introduced by Kimball (1990), which
is in turn related to the convexity of the following function
 (y) 
1
v
0
(y)
which, in our model, measures the marginal rate of substitution between
eort and income:
MRS
ey
=  
U
e
U
y
=

v
0
(y)
=
1
v
0
(y)
The function  (r) is convex if and only if the coeÆcient of prudence is
smaller than twice the coeÆcient of absolute risk aversion:
 
2v
00
v
0
  
v
000
v
00
(17)
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(the right-hand side of (17) is called the coeÆcient of prudence by Kimball,
1990).
4
LEMMA 4:
(i) If  (y) is concave, then
p
v
0
(s)
+
1  p
v
0
(u)

1
v
0
(ps+ (1  p)u)
(18)
and if  (y) is convex, then
p
v
0
(s)
+
1  p
v
0
(u)

1
v
0
(ps+ (1  p)u)
(19)
(ii) if  is small, then
1
v
0
(ps+ (1  p)u)

1
v
0
(rw)
(20)
Proof: Part (i) follows from Jensen's inequality.The inequality in part
(ii) holds if and only if
rw < ps+ (1  p)u (21)
Now, if  is small, then ps + (1   p)u = rw   rk(w) + pa   (

k   k(w))[r  
(1  p)(   1)] ' rw + pa  r

k > rw because of (2).
LEMMA 5: If  (y) is convex, then the curve EU may cut the curve
v(rw) from below at some value
b
w > 0, and then from above, at some value
e
w >
b
w. (see Figure 2).
Proof: see the Appendix and Figure 2.
PLEASE PLACE FIGURE 2 HERE.
The following proposition follows immediately from the above lemma:
Proposition 1: if the coeÆcient of prudence is smaller than twice the
coeÆcient of absolute risk aversion, then it is possible that, given r, there are
4
Note that decreasing absolute risk aversion holds i
 
v
000
v
00
>  
v
00
v
0
which is not inconsistent with (17). For further results on the role of v
000
, see Hartwick
(1999).
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two values
b
w(r) <
e
w(r) such that only individuals whose wealth lies between
them will choose to be entrepreneurs. Individuals with wealth exceeding
e
w(r), and those with wealth below
b
w(r) will choose to invest in the safe asset
(i.e., lend to nancial intermediaries).
REMARK: Proposition 1 may be explained as follows: given that the
marginal rate of substitution between eort and income is convex in y, indi-
viduals with very low wealth do not want to become entrepreneur because
they are not willing to take risks, and individuals who are very wealthy do
not want to become entrepreneur because they do not want to exert eort.
We now show how the two critical values
b
w(r) and
e
w(r) change when r
increases.
Proposition 2:
b
w
0
(r) > 0 and
e
w
0
(r) < 0 provided that (1   p) is
suÆciently small, where   f(r   )=(r   )g   1  0
Proof : see the Appendix.
3.4 Endogenous determination of the interest rate on
the safe asset
So far, we have taken the interest rate r as given. Now we turn to its
determination. This is given by the condition that the the interest rate
must equate the aggregate lending by non-entrepreneurs (to the nancial
institutions) to the aggregate borrowing by entrepreneurs (from the nancial
institutions). The former is given by
L(r) =
Z
bw(r)
w
L
wf(w)dw+
Z
w
H
ew(r)
wf(w)dw
and the latter is
B(r) =
Z
ew(r)
bw(r)
(

k   w)f(w)dw
The excess demand (function) for fund is
D(r) = B(r) L(r) =

k
Z
ew(r)
bw(r)
f(w)dw 
Z
w
H
w
L
wf(w)dw =

k
Z
ew(r)
bw(r)
f(w)dw  w
Clearly, if r is very high, then D(r) < 0, and if if r = 0, then D(r) < 0 (recall
that

k > w). By continuity, there exists a value r

such that D(r

) = 0.
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Furthermore, such r

is unique, because D
0
(r) < 0: Thus we obtain the
following result:
Proposition 3: There exists a unique r

> 0 such that the loan market
clears. Individuals with wealth exceeding
e
w(r

) lend all their wealth to the
nancial institutions, at the safe interest rate r

, and so do individuals with
wealth below
b
w(r

). Individuals whose wealth lies between these two critical
values will be entrepreneurs, and they invest a fraction of their wealth in the
safe asset, the remaining fraction being used as equity capital, which is always
less than the total amount of capital invested in each risky project. The
equilibrium fraction of the population who choose to become entrepreneurs
is
N
M
=
w

k
=
Z
ew(r

)
bw(r

)
f(w)dw. (22)
4 Open Economies
4.1 International Borrowing Under the Moral Hazard
Case
Now consider two countries with the same population size and the same level
of per capita wealth, but dierent distributions of wealth. We will look at
their autarkic equilibria, and examine the incentive for international borrow-
ing. Let us assume there are two countries, A and B. The density functions of
the two wealth distributions are respectively f
A
(w; 
A
) and f
B
(w; 
B
), where

A
and 
B
are shift parameters. Now consider the autarkic equilibrium of
country A, and let r
A
be the autarkic interest rate. Consider the following
thought experiment: Suppose the distribution f
A
(:) undergoes a change: 
A
now increases to 

A
, which makes f
A
(w; 

A
) < f
A
(w; 
A
) for all w in the
interval [
b
w(r
A
);
e
w(r
A
)]. Then clearly at the value r
A
, the number of willing
entrepreneurs will be less than N . To restore equilibrium, r
A
must be lower.
To make the above argument more precise, let us write the equation that
determines the equilibrium autarkic rate of interest as
F
A
[
e
w(r
A
); 
A
]  F
A
[
b
w(r
A
); 
A
] =
w

k
Then
dr
A
d
A
=  


 
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where
  
(
@
@w
F
A
[
e
w(r
A
); 
A
]
)
d
e
w(r
A
)
dr
 
(
@
@w
F
A
[
b
w(r
A
); 
A
]
)
d
b
w(r
A
)
dr
< 0
by Proposition 2, and

 
(
@
@
A
F
A
[
e
w(r
A
); 
A
]
)
 
(
@
@
A
F
A
[
b
w(r
A
); 
A
]
)
=
@
@
A
Z
ew(r
A
)
bw(r
A
)
f(w; 
A
)dw =
Z
ew(r
A
)
bw(r
A
)
@
@
A
f(w; 
A
)dw < 0
It follows that
dr
A
d
A
< 0.
Note that in the above argument, the condition
@
@
A
f(w; 
A
) < 0 over
[
b
w(r
A
);
e
w(r
A
)] is suÆcient, but not necessary, for 
 to be negative.
It follows from the above reasoning that if the density function f
B
(w; 
B
)
diers from f
A
(w; 
A
) in that
f
B
(w; 
B
) < f
A
(w; 
A
) for all w 2 [
b
w(r
A
);
e
w(r
A
)]
then country B will have a higher autarkic gross rate of return: r
B
> r
A
.
Under these conditions, the opening of world nancial markets will result in
capital ow from A to B. We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 4: Two countries with identical per capita wealth and i-
dentical individual utility function may engage in intertemporal trade if the
distributions of wealth are dierent.
Corollary: A marginal redistribution of wealth away from the enter-
preneurial class of a country can turn that country status from being a net
lender to a net borrower.
4.2 Bailouts
In this section, we set up a framework for studying the implications of gov-
ernment policies that seek to help bankrupt entrepreneurs. Suppose the
government taxes successful entrepreneurs, collecting from them amount T
each, and pay the unsuccessful ones an amount : Balanced budget requires
that
pT
Z
ew(r)
bw(r)
f(w)dw = (1  p)
Z
ew(r)
bw(r)
f(w)dt (23)
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where [
b
w(r);
e
w(r)] are solutions of the equation
v(rw) = pv [(w   k)r + (a  R)  T ]+(1 p)v
h
(w   k)r   (

k   k) + 
i
 1
Does this bailout policy result in a lower or higher equilibrium interest rate?
What is its implication on the country's net borrowing?
First, note that (23) implies that
dT
d
=
1  p
p
The contract between the nancial intermediary (FI) and the entrepreneur
with wealth w must now satisfy
(p  q) [v(s)  v(u)] = 1 (24)
and
pR =


k   k

[r   (1  p)] (25)
where now
s  (w   k)r + (a R)  T
and
u  (w   k)r   (

k   k) + 
From (24) and (25), we have
@k
@T
=
pv
0
(s)
pv
0
(u)(r   ) + (1  p)v
0
(s)(r   )
and
@k
@
=
pv
0
(u)
pv
0
(u)(r   ) + (1  p)v
0
(s)(r   )
Hence
dk
d
=
@k
@T
dT
d
+
@k
@
=
(1  p)v
0
(s) + pv
0
(u)
pv
0
(u)(r   ) + (1  p)v
0
(s)(r   )
To nd the respose of the intersection points
e
w(r) and
b
w(r) with respect
to , we use the equation of indierence, which is now
q
p  q
+ v
h
(w   k

)r   (

k   k

) + 
i
= v(wr) (26)
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where k

= k

(w; T; (T )). From (26) we get
dw
d
=

1


(1  p)v
0
(u)v
0
(s)(   1)
(1  p)v
0
(s)(r   ) + pv
0
(u)(r   )
(27)
where
 = v
0
(s)
"
r   (r   )
@k
@w
#
  v
0
(NE)r (28)
which is positive at
b
w(r) and negative at
e
w(r). Hence, for a given r,
b
w(r)
increases and
e
w(r) decreases when there is an increase in . This implies that
the number of entrepreneurs increases, leading to an increases in the demand
for fund. To restore equilibrium, the rate of interest r must increase.
Proposition 5: Bail-out policies of the type described above will lead to
an increase in the equilibrium rate of interest. In a two-country world, this
means that the country with such bail-out policies will become the debtor
country.
REMARK: The role of the bankuptcy cost factor  < 1 is crucial here.
If  = 1, then bailouts have no eect on the equilibrium interest rate.
5 Concluding remarks
We have set up a model to show that a country's wealth distribution in-
uences the occupational choice of individuals: to be or not to be an en-
trepreneur. We have also showed that, under certain assumptions, only the
middle-class individuals choose to be entrepreneurs. An implication is that
countries that have the same level of per capita wealth and the same indi-
vidual utility function may engage in mutual intertemporal trade, as long as
they have dierent wealth distributions. The key elements in our model are
(i) the tension between consumption smoothing across states of nature on
the one hand, and contract design to overcome moral hazard on the other
hand, (ii) the relationship between of the coeÆcients of prudence and risk
aversion, and (iii) bankruptcy cost and partial liability.
There are several directions of generalization, which we wish to pursue in
our future work. An obvious extension is the process of capital accumulation.
One would then be able to see how moral hazard and initial wealth distribu-
tions inuence growth rates, and to determine conditions under which cycles
may occur. Taxation policies, including transfers, may be studied in the
context of moral hazard and endogenous choice of occupation.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Consider the problem
max
R;k
G(R; k; w; 1) = pv((w  k)r+ a R)+ (1  p)v((w  k)r (

k  k))  1
subject to
v((w   k)r + a  R)  v((w   k)r   (

k   k)) 
1
p  q
(29)
and
pR  (

k   k) [r   (1  p)]  0 (30)
In the (k; R) space, the feasible set is the intersection of area above the line
R =
(

k   k)
p
[r   (1  p)] (31)
with the area below the (positively sloped) curve dened by (29), see Figure 2.
The absolute value of the slope of the line (31), dR=dp, is approximately r=p
if  is small. Now it is easy to verify that the objective function G(R; k; w; 1)
is strictly concave and decreasing in (k; R). This means that the iso-expected
utility curves are concave in the (k; R) space, with negative slope given by
@R
@k
=
 G
k
G
R
If  is small, the absolute value of this slope is approximately (r=p) [v
0
(u)=v
0
(s)] >
(r=p). It follows that the maximum occurs at the point where both con-
straints hold with equality.
PROOF OF LEMMA 5:
Let (w)  v(rw)   EU(w) be the dierence between the utility of a
pure lender with wealth w and the expected utility of an entrepreneur hav-
ing the same wealth. We wish to nd conditions which imply that (w) is
a U shaped curve, taking positive values for small w, negative values for
intermediate values of w, and positive values again for large values of w.
By denition
(w) = v(rw)  pv(s)  (1  p)v(u) + 1 (32)
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Making use of (9) we can re-write (w) as
(w) = v(rw)  [v(u) + q=(p  q)] (33)
We want to show that 
0
(w) < 0 for small w and 
0
(w) > 0 for large w.
Now

0
= rv
0
(rw)  v
0
(u) [r(1  k
0
(w)) + k
0
(w)]
where
@k
@w
=
pr [v
0
(u)  v
0
(s)]
pv
0
(u)(r   ) + (1  p)v
0
(s)(r   )
(34)

0
(w) is negative i
H  v
0
(u)
"
r   (r   )
@k
@w
#
  rv
0
(rw) > 0 (35)
which is equivalent to
r   (r   )
@k
@w
>
rv
0
(rw)
v
0
(u)
i.e.,
"
1 
v
0
(rw)
v
0
(u)
#
r > (r   )
@k
@w
i.e.,
"
v
0
(u)  v
0
(rw)
v
0
(u)
#
> (r   )
p [v
0
(u)  v
0
(s)]
pv
0
(u)(r   ) + (1  p)v
0
(s)(r   )
i.e.,
"
v
0
(u)  v
0
(rw)
v
0
(u)
#
>
p [v
0
(u)  v
0
(s)]
pv
0
(u) + (1  p)v
0
(s)f(r   )=(r   )g
(36)
Let 1 +  = f(r   )=(r   )g  1. Inequality (36) holds i
"
v
0
(u)  v
0
(rw)
v
0
(u)
#
>
p [v
0
(u)  v
0
(s)]
pv
0
(u) + (1  p)v
0
(s)(1 + )
(37)
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Now (37) holds i
"
pv
0
(u) + (1  p)v
0
(s)(1 + )
v
0
(u)v
0
(s)
#
[v
0
(u)  v
0
(rw)] >
p [v
0
(u)  v
0
(s)]
v
0
(s)
(38)
Let
Z =
pv
0
(u) + (1  p)v
0
(s)
v
0
(u)v
0
(s)
(39)
Then (38) holds i
1 + (1  p)
"
1 
v
0
(rw)
v
0
(u)
#
> Zv
0
(rw) (40)
i
[Zv
0
(rw)  1]  (1  p)
"
1 
v
0
(rw)
v
0
(u(w))
#
< 0 (41)
Note that v(rw) = v(u) + q=(p   q) implies that rw > u(w) and hence
1  
v
0
(rw)
v
0
(u(w))
> 0: We want the inequality (41) to hold for small w and to be
reversed for large w. Now, from Lemma 4, if  is small and  (w) is convex,
then
p
v
0
(s)
+
1  p
v
0
(u)
>
1
v
0
(rw)
and hence Zv
0
(rw) > 1, and (w) may be U -shaped if (1  p)
h
1 
v
0
(rw)
v
0
(u(w))
i
is larger [respectively, smaller] than [Zv
0
(rw)  1] for small w; and smaller
[respectively, larger] than it for large w.
It follows that if  (w) is convex, then the EU curve may cut the v(rw)
curve from below at some
b
w, and then from above, at some
e
w >
b
w.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
From (8) and (9), we have
@k
@w
=
1

[v
0
(u)  v
0
(s)] pr > 0
and
@k
@r
=
1

h
fv
0
(u)  v
0
(s)g(w   k)p+ v
0
(s)(

k   k)
i
where
 = pv
0
(u)(r   ) + (1  p)v
0
(s)(r   ) > 0
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Dierentiating the condition for indierence (equation (??)) with respect to
r, we get
dw
dr
=
1
H
"
wv
0
(NE)  v
0
(u)(w   k) + (r   )v
0
(u)
@k
@r
#
(42)
where H, dened in (35) above, is positive at
b
w(r) and negative at
e
w(r).
The numerator in(42) must now be signed. It can be written as
wv
0
(NE) + v
0
(u)
"
p(w   k)fv
0
(u)  v
00
(s)g+ v
0
(s)(

k   k)
pv
0
(u) + (1  p)v
0
(s)(1 + )
  (w   k)
#
The term inside the square brackets can be written as
v
0
(s)(w   k)
"

k   k
w   k
  1  (1  p)
#
or
v
0
(s)(w   k)
"

k   w
w   k
  (1  p)
#
Now, since w   k(w) is increasing in w, we have

k   w
w   k(w)
>

k   w
w
H
  k(w
H
)
>

k   w
H
w
H
  k(w
H
)
which is positive if

k > w
H
and  is suÆciently small.
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